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The Evolution of Customer Asset Protection
After Brokerage Bankruptcy

By Ronald H. Filler

Bettmann

On “Black Monday,” October 19, 1987,
the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped
22%. It was an unusually volatile trading
day in which the US stock market experienced its largest single-day decline. The
market volatility caused many brokerage
firms to fail and resulted in losses to customers beyond the declining price of their
holdings. These losses were caused by the
bankruptcy of their brokerages.
Over the past 80 years, laws and regulations have evolved to provide greater
protections to customers of US brokerage
firms. However, they are not always effective, particularly on volatile trading days.
The US Congress and market regulators want all US residents to open bank
accounts, and to feel comfortable that their
funds deposited in banks are protected. To
that end, the government provides insurance protection on bank account deposits
through the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). Thanks to FDIC
insurance, people no longer need to fear
the “Wild, Wild West” stories of bank
robbers fleeing with their deposits.
However, banks can freely use customer
deposits for legitimate business reasons,
such as making auto and small business
loans, issuing home mortgages, etc. To
support these banking arrangements and
to encourage people to deposit their funds
in a bank account, the FDIC program
provides important insurance protections
to bank customers in the event their bank
is robbed, or fails for any reason.
Historically, FDIC insurance topped
out at $100,000, but it was increased
Bank failure notice from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation is tacked up on the New
Jersey Title Guarantee and Trust Company’s door
in 1939. At the time, it was by far the largest bank
failure to be paid off by the FDIC since its inception.

in 2008 to $250,000. For married couples, the $250,000 ceiling applies to each
spouse’s account and a joint account in
their names, as each account is for a different beneficial owner. Therefore, for singles
the maximum coverage is $250,000, but
for married couples it could be as high
as $750,000. If a person has more cash
than is covered by these ceilings, he or she
should open accounts at multiple banks.
The same is true for stock brokerage
accounts. The US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has adopted specific
regulations that protect customers who
fully pay for their securities (SEC Rule
15c3-3), but stock brokerage firms also use
customer funds and securities for other
purposes, especially when customers buy
stocks on margin. Under these circumstances, the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC) program caps out at
$500,000 (no more than $250,000 in cash)
for a single person, but it also expands its
insurance coverage for married couples,
similar to the FDIC program.
There are exceptions to these rules, however. An example from recent financial history is the Bernie Madoff case. Madoff stole
more than $50 billion from his stock customers in an elaborate Ponzi scheme. Several court cases resulted when his scheme
was unraveled. The courts held that many
of Madoff’s customers could not receive
additional insurance coverage if they had
previously withdrawn amounts from their
accounts with him over the years.
For example, if someone had deposited
$700,000 with Madoff in 1998, let’s assume
his account increased in value to $1.8 million. If that person withdrew $500,000 in
2004 (leaving a balance of $1.3 million)
and tried to claim his $500,000 in insurance coverage once the Ponzi scheme was
discovered in December 2008, he would be
out of luck. The SIPC Trustee appointed to

oversee the Madoff estate said, in essence,
that since he had already received more
than $500,000 in 2004, he was not entitled
to additional insurance coverage.
Futures and Swaps
Unlike bank and brokerage accounts, there
is no insurance coverage program for
accounts used to trade futures contracts
and swaps, even though these financial
products are subject to significant laws
and regulations. The reason is simple;
these markets are primarily institutional
in nature, so they do not have the same
public policy reason for the insurance as
banks and stock brokerage firms, which are
primarily retail in nature. The US Congress
recognized this as far back as 1936, when it
adopted the Commodity Exchange Act and
added Section 4d, which required then, and
still mandates today, that all futures commission merchants (FCM) — e.g., futures
brokerage firms — maintain all customer
assets held by the FCM in a “customer segregated” account at a custodian bank.
This concept can be visualized as a ring
fence around a specially protected customer asset account. Thus, if the FCM fails
for any reason, creditors of that FCM cannot pierce that ring and use the customer
assets held inside it to satisfy its debts.
Moreover, FCMs cannot commingle its
own assets with the customer assets held
in this protected account.
Customer segregation has worked quite
well over the past 80 years. There have been
a few bumps along the way but, for the most
part, any time an FCM has failed, its customer assets have been protected. However,
if there were not sufficient customer assets in
the segregated account — and thus a shortfall occurred — pursuant to the US Bankruptcy Code (the Code), the remaining nondefaulting customers would be treated on a
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Headline from the Philadelphia Inquirer during the Crash of 1987.

pro rata basis, and each would share equally
based on the percentage of the shortfall.
For example, if a segregated account
should hold $100 million of customer
assets, but only $98 million was in the
account at the close of a business day,
there would be a 2% shortfall. If the customer had deposited $100,000 with that
FCM to meet his margin requirements,
then he would only receive $98,000 back,
taking into effect that shortfall.
Notable Bankruptcies:
Lehman, MF Global and Peregrine
There have been some noteworthy FCM
bankruptcies in recent years. The largest
involved Lehman Brothers, which filed for
bankruptcy in September 2008. On Monday, September 15, Lehman had approximately $10 billion in customer assets. By
the close of business on Friday, September
19, all futures positions had been either
transferred to other FCMs or liquidated,
and all customer assets were properly
transferred without a dollar lost by any
of Lehman’s futures customers. It showed
34

that if an FCM follows the applicable laws
and regulations, then the system works.
That is not always the case, however.
On October 31, 2011, another large FCM,
MF Global, filed for bankruptcy with a
shortfall of approximately $1.2 billion in
customer funds. While MF Global’s customers did eventually receive 100% of
their assets, they initially got back only
70%. The remaining 30% was transferred
to them over the next few years.
A few months later, another FCM, Peregrine Financial Group, filed for bankruptcy
with a shortfall of approximately $200 million. That FCM only had $400 million in
customer assets, so the shortfall totaled
nearly 50%. Because of these two bankruptcies and the resulting shortfalls in their
customer segregated accounts, a number
of regulatory changes have recently taken
place. Most notably, all FCMs and their custodian banks holding customer assets must
now report their account balances each
morning to the regulators. Thus, the regulators can now compare the amount that
should be held in its customer segregated
account to the totals shown in its various
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custodian accounts. If any significant difference occurs, the regulators can take immediate action to determine the reason for the
difference. Prior to this rule, FCMs only
reported their balances on a monthly basis.
Another major regulatory change
requires the CEO or his designee to
approve any transfer of 25% or more
out of the customer segregated account.
Most FCMs today deposit a large amount
of their own capital into the segregated
account to ensure, to the extent possible,
that no shortfall in the account will occur.
This FCM capital investment is called
the “residual interest.” Once the FCM’s
capital is so deposited into the customer
segregated account, it is deemed to be
“customer property.” This means that if
the FCM fails for any reason, its capital
so deposited will first be treated to protect
the FCM’s customers and may not be used
by any of its creditors until the customers
receive 100% of their assets back.
Assuming the FCM is doing well but
wants to transfer back some of its own
capital that was held in the customer segregated account, » continued on page 38
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the senior-most officer of that FCM must
approve that transfer. This is commonly
referred to as the “Jon Corzine Rule.”
Corzine was the CEO of MF Global at the
time of its bankruptcy, and a large amount
of funds had been transferred out of the
segregated account.
There are some key legal distinctions
involving the failure of an FCM versus that
of a stock brokerage firm. The insolvency
of a stock brokerage firm is governed by
the Securities Investor Protection Act and
Section III of the US Bankruptcy Code.
These laws provide the special SIPC insurance coverage noted above. An FCM’s
bankruptcy is governed by Section IV of
the US Bankruptcy Code and Part 190
of the CFTC regulations. Together, they
deal with the pro rata treatment of the
non-defaulting customers of the failed
FCM. They also do not treat property of a
customer that can be specifically identified
as belonging to that customer.
This is not the case for stock brokerage
firms that fail. If a customer owns 100
shares of ABC, then he will receive back
those 100 shares. On the other hand, if
a customer deposits US Treasury bills
to satisfy his margin requirements in a
futures account, those government securities will be sold and converted to cash,
with the customer receiving his pro rata
share if a shortfall occurs
Customer Protection in Global Markets
The industry has learned quite a bit in
recent years given these large FCM bankruptcies, but there is more to be done given
that today’s markets are clearly global in
nature. People living in the United States
can now easily trade financial products on
more than 35 non-US exchanges. Yet, the
bankruptcy laws in those countries vary
greatly from the US Bankruptcy Code,
which has specific provisions dealing with
the failure of a stock brokerage firm (Section III) and the failure of an FCM (Section IV). Outside the United States, many
countries do not have laws protecting
customers of failed financial firms.
What is now urgently needed is for the
G-20 countries to devise a plan to harmonize the bankruptcy laws of these countries so that customers of failed financial
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Jon S. Corzine, former chairman and CEO of MF Global, testifies before the House Financial Services
Committee on December 15, 2011. US authorities were investigating whether MF Global intentionally tapped
customer funds to cover the bankrupt firm’s margin payments on European government bond trades.

firms are treated fairly, hopefully with
similar, or approximately similar, results.
Most of the focus since the financial crisis
in 2008 has dealt with how OTC derivatives should be regulated. The G-20 countries are gaining ground on the promise
they all made in Pittsburgh in September
2009 to have a more harmonized global
regulatory system in place that regulates
OTC derivatives. Now, they need to focus
on protecting customers of failed financial
firms in a more harmonized way.
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